资料：New York and London may rule the roost, but other financial hubs in America and Europe have managed to carve out useful specialist niches for themselves. Chicago, for instance, has consolidated its position as the world’s derivatives center, and Housto

Practice 6　　The financial crisis presents an opportunity for China to seize the leadership baton for globalization and become its centre for goods, services and capital, while catalyzing a new China boom that could last a decade or longer. That boom could turn China into the world’s largest economy—and a developed country—within two decades.　　The global economy has run like a motorcycle, with American consumption as one wheel and China’s savings as the other, with everyone else piled up on top. The sustainability of this world depended on foreigners believing in the Wall Street debt instruments that paid for America’s imports while keeping inflation at bay. Inflation came three years ago with surging oil prices. The tightening that accompanied it burst the US property bubble in 2006. It took another year for the subprime market, and still another for financial derivatives, to blow up. The resulting crisis has destroyed Wall Street’s credibility. The motorcycle economy has fallen over.　　The global financial crisis is casting a shadow over globalization. Developed economies may resort to protectionism to keep jobs at home, leading to a vicious cycle of recession and more protectionism. China is in a position to carry the baton for globalization.

Practice 6　　If there's a threat of dangerous deflation—a general fall in prices—the causes lie as much in Europe and Japan as in the United States. The inevitable collapse of America's speculative boom need not have been especially damaging if the world's other advanced economies were healthy. Their expanding appetite for imports would have bolstered the United States and so-called emerging market countries, from Brazil to South Korea. The trouble is that other advanced economies aren't healthy.　　Deflation could emerge from simultaneous slumps in the world's three major economies. Prices drop because there's too little global demand chasing too much global supply—everything from steel to shoes. Japan's ills are well known. Its banks are awash in bad loans. Less understood (at least in the United States) is the fact that Europe's troubles stem significantly from Germany. Germany is Europe's “sick man”, just as Japan is Asia's. Only 15 years ago, these countries seemed poised to assume leadership of the world economy. Now they are dragging it down.

Practice 4　　Europeans have long aspired to end American dominance as the world’s economic leader. The single market and the euro are widely seen as essential steps in this direction. But is Europe ready to lead? Do Europeans understand what it would take?　　Despite a budding recovery, the United States is hardly the model of economic health that it once was. On several issues—from steel tariffs to the resurgent deficit to shady corporate practices—America has demonstrated a growing failure of leadership. Over the past two decades the United States has shown what it takes to be an economic superpower—a strong currency, openness to imports, concessions in trade negotiations and articulating an economic philosophy for the rest of the world. Now that it’s apparently fading on so many counts, the question becomes: is Europe willing and prepared to do what the United States once did, in order to supplant it?　　First the exchange-rate issue. The euro will probably continue strengthening against the dollar, if only because of America’s huge and growing $400 billion-a-year current-account deficit. This means that, every year, the United States borrows about 4 percent of its GDP on world markets. If international investors lose confidence in the U.S. economy, fewer people will want to hold dollar assets. The dollar will fall—and the euro will appreciate.　　This may be a normal market cycle, but there will be consequences. Among others, European companies will see their U.S. profits erode. What happens if the dollar falls farther and faster than anticipated? Are European industrial companies ready to compete with a euro worth $1.10, $1.15 or $1.25? The flip side of the much-desired strong euro would almost certainly be a surge in imports from the United States and the rest of the world. Exports might fall, resulting in job losses—perhaps even a trade deficit for the European Union.　　Europeans are rightfully angry at new U.S. steel tariffs. But given the sheer size of America’s trade deficit, Washington’s policies are actually relatively moderate. The question remains: if Europe were in a similar position, would its voters and politicians be equally sensitive to what’s best for the global economy? Would European politicians be able to face the incredible pressures that would build for protectionist measures if it were Europe, and not the United States, that ran a persistent trade deficit? Not likely, I fear.　　America’s retreat from its leading role presents an opportunity for the European Union. Trouble is, its political institutions have yet to mature to the point where they can resolve trade disputes, say, by looking beyond the immediate and narrow self-interests of its member states.　　Europe’s chance for economic leadership may come sooner than expected. But too many Europeans haven’t yet grasped the basic secret of America’s leadership—the hard work and tough choices that are involved. That’s what Europeans now face, in this season of elections and decision making that will shape their future. Let’s hope they recognize that such sacrifices will pay off for them, as well as for the rest of the world.

Which of the following statements is INCORRECT?