3 Local neighbourhood shops are finding it increasingly difficult to compete with supermarkets. However, three years
ago, the Perfect Shopper franchise group was launched that allowed these neighbourhood shops to join the group
and achieve cost savings on tinned and packaged goods, particularly groceries. Perfect Shopper purchases branded
goods in bulk from established food suppliers and stores them in large purpose-built warehouses, each designed to
serve a geographical region. When Perfect Shopper was established it decided that deliveries to these warehouses
should be made by the food suppliers or by haulage contractors working on behalf of these suppliers. Perfect Shopper
places orders with these suppliers and the supplier arranges the delivery to the warehouse. These arrangements are
still in place. Perfect Shopper has no branded goods of its own.
Facilities are available in each warehouse to re-package goods into smaller units, more suitable for the requirements
of the neighbourhood shop. These smaller units, typically containing 50–100 tins or packs, are usually small trays,
sealed with strong transparent polythene. Perfect Shopper delivers these to its neighbourhood shops using specialist
haulage contractors local to the regional warehouse. Perfect Shopper has negotiated significant discounts with
suppliers, part of which it passes on to its franchisees. A recent survey in a national grocery magazine showed that
franchisees saved an average of 10% on the prices they would have paid if they had purchased the products directly
from the manufacturer or from an intermediary – such as cash and carry wholesalers.
As well as offering savings due to bulk buying, Perfect Shopper also provides, as part of its franchise:
(i) Personalised promotional material. This usually covers specific promotions and is distributed locally, either using
specialist leaflet distributors or loosely inserted into local free papers or magazines.
(ii) Specialised signage for the shops to suggest the image of a national chain. The signs include the Perfect Shopper
slogan ‘the nation’s local’.
(iii) Specialist in-store display units for certain goods, again branded with the Perfect Shopper logo.
Perfect Shopper does not provide all of the goods required by a neighbourhood shop. Consequently, it is not an
exclusive franchise. Franchisees agree to purchase specific products through Perfect Shopper, but other goods, such
as vegetables, fruit, stationery and newspapers they source from elsewhere. Deliveries are made every two weeks to
franchisees using a standing order for products agreed between the franchisee and their Perfect Shopper sales
representative at a meeting they hold every three months. Variations to this order can be made by telephone, but only
if the order is increased. Downward variations are not allowed. Franchisees cannot reduce their standing order
requirements until the next meeting with their representative.
Perfect Shopper was initially very successful, but its success has been questioned by a recent independent report that
showed increasing discontent amongst franchisees. The following issues were documented.
(i) The need to continually review prices to compete with supermarkets
(ii) Low brand recognition of Perfect Shopper
(iii) Inflexible ordering and delivery system based around forecasts and restricted ability to vary orders (see above)
As a result of this survey, Perfect Shopper has decided to review its business model. Part of this review is to reexamine
the supply chain, to see if there are opportunities for addressing some of its problems.
Required:
(a) Describe the primary activities of the value chain of Perfect Shopper. (5 marks)
第1题:
(b) The management of Division C has identified the need to achieve cost savings in order to become more
competitive. They have decided that an analysis and investigation of quality costs into four sub-categories will
provide a focus for performance measurement and improvement.
Required:
Identify the FOUR sub-categories into which quality costs can be analysed and provide examples (which
must relate to Division C) of each of the four sub-categories of quality cost that can be investigated in order
that overall cost savings might be achieved and hence the performance improved. (8 marks)
第2题:
These shops()to the needs of children.
A、meet
B、solve
C、cater
答案:A
解析:固定搭配meet to the needs,满足需求。
第3题:
第4题:
第5题:
第6题:
A 15-year-old boy was()for stealing 22 charity boxes from local shops.
Aconvicted
Bsentenced
Carrested
Dattacked
第7题:
Which statement is true of a source that wants to transmit multicast traffic to group 239.1.1.1?()
第8题:
You need to configure connectors between each routing group. What are two possible ways to achieve this goal?()
第9题:
第10题:
第11题:
The streets are lined with hotels, motels, tour buses, and huge billboards advertising shows, shops, and mails.
The streets are lined with hotels, motels, and tour buses whose occupants take in huge billboards that are everywhere advertising shows, shops, and malls.
Huge billboards surrounding hotels, motels, and tour buses, which are everywhere, advertise shows, shops, and mails.
Huge billboards advertise shows, shops, and malls and surround hotels, motels, and tour buses, which are everywhere.
The streets are lined: hotels, motels, and tour buses me everywhere, and their occupants take in huge billboards advertising shows, shops, and malls.
第12题:
increased equipment life
increased material costs
increased asset downtime
increased labor purchases
increased labor utilization
increased asset utilization
第13题:
This scenario summarises the development of a company called Rock Bottom through three phases, from its founding in 1965 to 2008 when it ceased trading.
Phase 1 (1965–1988)
In 1965 customers usually purchased branded electrical goods, largely produced by well-established domestic companies, from general stores that stocked a wide range of household products. However, in that year, a recent university graduate, Rick Hein, established his first shop specialising solely in the sale of electrical goods. In contrast to the general stores, Rick Hein’s shop predominantly sold imported Japanese products which were smaller, more reliable and more sophisticated than the products of domestic competitors. Rick Hein quickly established a chain of shops, staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the products they were selling. He backed this up with national advertising in the press, an innovation at the time for such a specialist shop. He branded his shops as ‘Rock Bottom’, a name which specifically referred to his cheap prices, but also alluded to the growing importance of
rock music and its influence on product sales. In 1969, 80% of sales were of music centres, turntables, amplifiers and speakers, bought by the newly affluent young. Rock Bottom began increasingly to specialise in selling audio equipment.
Hein also developed a high public profile. He dressed unconventionally and performed a number of outrageous stunts that publicised his company. He also encouraged the managers of his stores to be equally outrageous. He rewarded their individuality with high salaries, generous bonus schemes and autonomy. Many of the shops were extremely successful, making their managers (and some of their staff) relatively wealthy people.
However, by 1980 the profitability of the Rock Bottom shops began to decline significantly. Direct competitors using a similar approach had emerged, including specialist sections in the large general stores that had initially failed to react to the challenge of Rock Bottom. The buying public now expected its electrical products to be cheap and reliable.
Hein himself became less flamboyant and toned down his appearance and actions to satisfy the banks who were becoming an increasingly important source of the finance required to expand and support his chain of shops.
Phase 2 (1989–2002)
In 1988 Hein considered changing the Rock Bottom shops into a franchise, inviting managers to buy their own shops (which at this time were still profitable) and pursuing expansion though opening new shops with franchisees from outside the company. However, instead, he floated the company on the country’s stock exchange. He used some of the capital raised to expand the business. However, he also sold shares to help him throw the ‘party of a lifetime’ and to purchase expensive goods and gifts for his family. Hein became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the newly quoted company, but over the next thirteen years his relationship with his board and shareholders became increasingly difficult. Gradually new financial controls and reporting systems were put in place. Most of the established managers left as controls became more centralised and formal. The company’s performance was solid but unspectacular. Hein complained that ‘business was not fun any more’. The company was legally required to publish directors’ salaries in its annual report and the generous salary package enjoyed by the Chairman and CEO increasingly became an issue and it dominated the 2002 Annual General Meeting (AGM). Hein was embarrassed by its publication and the discussion it led to in the national media. He felt that it was an infringement of his privacy and
civil liberties.
Phase 3 (2003–2008)
In 2003 Hein found the substantial private equity investment necessary to take Rock Bottom private again. He also used all of his personal fortune to help re-acquire the company from the shareholders. He celebrated ‘freeing Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the world to attend. However, most of the new generation of store managers found Hein’s style. to be too loose and unfocused. He became rude and angry about their lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Furthermore, changes in products and how they were purchased meant that fewer people bought conventional audio products from specialist shops. The reliability of these products now meant that they were replaced relatively infrequently. Hein, belatedly, started to consider selling via an Internet site. Turnover and profitability plummeted. In 2007 Hein again considered franchising the company,but he realised that this was unlikely to be successful. In early 2008 the company ceased trading and Hein himself,now increasingly vilified and attacked by the press, filed for personal bankruptcy.
Required:
(a) Analyse the reasons for Rock Bottom’s success or failure in each of the three phases identified in the
scenario. Evaluate how Rick Hein’s leadership style. contributed to the success or failure of each phase.
(18 marks)
(b) Rick Hein considered franchising the Rock Bottom brand at two points in its history – 1988 and 2007.
Explain the key factors that would have made franchising Rock Bottom feasible in 1988, but would have
made it ‘unlikely to be successful’ in 2007. (7 marks)
(a) The product life cycle model suggests that a product passes through six stages: introduction, development, growth, shakeout,
maturity and decline. The first Rock Bottom phase appears to coincide with the introduction, development and growth periods
of the products offered by the company. These highly specified, high quality products were new to the country and were
quickly adopted by a certain consumer segment (see below). The life cycle concept also applies to services, and the innovative
way in which Rock Bottom sold and marketed the products distinguished the company from potential competitors. Not only
were these competitors still selling inferior and older products but their retail methods looked outdated compared with Rock Bottom’s bright, specialist shops. Rock Bottom’s entry into the market-place also exploited two important changes in the
external environment. The first was the technological advance of the Japanese consumer electronics industry. The second
was the growing economic power of young people, who wished to spend their increasing disposable income on products that
allowed them to enjoy popular music. Early entrants into an industry gain experience of that industry sooner than others. This
may not only be translated into cost advantages but also into customer loyalty that helps them through subsequent stages of
the product’s life cycle. Rock Bottom enjoyed the advantages of a first mover in this industry.
Hein’s leadership style. appears to have been consistent with contemporary society and more than acceptable to his young
target market. As an entrepreneur, his charismatic leadership was concerned with building a vision for the organisation and
then energising people to achieve it. The latter he achieved through appointing branch managers who reflected, to some
degree, his own style. and approach. His willingness to delegate considerable responsibility to these leaders, and to reward
them well, was also relatively innovative. The shops were also staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the
products they were selling. It was an early recognition that intangible resources of skills and knowledge were important to the
organisation.
In summary, in the first phase Rock Bottom’s organisation and Hein’s leadership style. appear to have been aligned with
contemporary society, the customer base, employees and Rock Bottom’s position in the product/service life cycle.
The second phase of the Rock Bottom story appears to reflect the shakeout and maturity phases of the product life cycle. The
entry of competitors into the market is a feature of the growth stage. However, it is in the shakeout stage that the market
becomes saturated with competitors. The Rock Bottom product and service approach is easily imitated. Hein initially reacted
to these new challenges by a growing maturity, recognising that outrageous behaviour might deter the banks from lending to
him. However, the need to raise money to fund expansion and a latent need to realise (and enjoy) his investment led to the
company being floated on the country’s stock exchange. This, eventually, created two problems.
The first was the need for the company to provide acceptable returns to shareholders. This would have been a new challenge
for Hein. He would have to not only maintain dividends to external shareholders, but he would also have to monitor and
improve the publicly quoted share price. In an attempt to establish an organisation that could deliver such value, changes
were made in the organisational structure and style. Most of the phase 1 entrepreneur-style. managers left. This may have
been inevitable anyway as Rock Bottom would have had problems continuing with such high individual reward packages in
a maturing market. However, the new public limited organisation also demanded managers who were more transactional
leaders, focusing on designing systems and controlling performance. This style. of management was alien to Rick’s approach.
The second problem was the need for the organisation to become more transparent. The publishing of Hein’s financial details
was embarrassing, particularly as his income fuelled a life-style. that was becoming less acceptable to society. What had once
appeared innovative and amusing now looked like an indulgence. The challenge now was for Hein to change his leadership
style. to suit the new situation. However, he ultimately failed to do this. Like many leaders who have risen to their position
through entrepreneurial ability and a dominant spirit, the concept of serving stakeholders rather than ordering them around
proved too difficult to grasp. The sensible thing would have been to leave Rock Bottom and start afresh. However, like many
entrepreneurs he was emotionally attached to the company and so he persuaded a group of private equity financiers to help
him buy it back. Combining the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also controversial and likely to attract
criticism concerning corporate governance.
In summary, in the second phase of Hein’s leadership he failed to change his approach to reflect changing social values, a
maturing product/service market-place and the need to serve new and important stakeholders in the organisation. He clearly
saw the public limited company as a ‘shackle’ on his ambition and its obligations an infringement of his personal privacy.
It can be argued that Hein took Rock Bottom back into private ownership just as the product life cycle moved into its decline
stage. The product life cycle is a timely reminder that any product or service has a finite life. Forty years earlier, as a young
man, Hein was in touch with the technological and social changes that created a demand for his product and service.
However, he had now lost touch with the forces shaping the external environment. Products have now moved on. Music is
increasingly delivered through downloaded files that are then played through computers (for home use) or MP3s (for portable
use). Even where consumers use traditional electronic equipment, the reliability of this equipment means that it is seldom
replaced. The delivery method, through specialised shops, which once seemed so innovative is now widely imitated and
increasingly, due to the Internet, less cost-effective. Consumers of these products are knowledgeable buyers and are only
willing to purchase, after careful cost and delivery comparisons, through the Internet. Hence, Hein is in a situation where he
faces more competition to supply products which are used and replaced less frequently, using a sales channel that is
increasingly uncompetitive. Consequently, Hein’s attempt to re-vitalise the shops by using the approach he adopted in phase
1 of the company was always doomed to failure. This failure was also guaranteed by the continued presence of the managers
appointed in phase 2 of the company. These were managers used to tight controls and targets set by centralised management.
To suddenly be let loose was not what they wanted and Hein appears to have reacted to their inability to act entrepreneurially
with anger and abuse. Hein’s final acts of reinvention concerned the return to a hedonistic, conspicuous life style. that he had
enjoyed in the early days of the company. He probably felt that this was possible now that he did not have the reporting
requirements of the public limited company. However, he had failed to recognise significant changes in society. He celebrated
the freeing of ‘Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the
world to attend. It seems inevitable that the cost and carbon footprint of such an event would now attract criticism.
Finally, in summary, Hein’s approach and leadership style. in phase 3 became increasingly out of step with society’s
expectations, customers’ requirements and employees’ expectations. However, unlike phase 2, Hein was now free of the
responsibilities and controls of professional management in a public limited company. This led him to conspicuous activities
that further devalued the brand, meaning that its demise was inevitable.
(b) At the end of the first phase Hein still had managers who were entrepreneurial in their outlook. It might have been attractive
for them to become franchisees, particularly as this might be a way of protecting their income through the more challenging
stages of the product and service life cycle that lay ahead. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again (phase
3), the managers were unlikely to be of the type that would take up the challenge of running a franchise. These were
managers used to meeting targets within the context of centrally determined policies and budgets within a public limited
company. Hein would have to make these employees redundant (at significant cost) and with no certainty that he could find
franchisees to replace them.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was a strong brand, associated with youth and innovation. First movers often retain
customer loyalty even when their products and approach have been imitated by new aggressive entrants to the market. A
strong brand is essential for a successful franchise as it is a significant part of what the franchisee is buying. However, by the
time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, the brand was devalued by his behaviour and incongruent with
customer expectations and sales channels. For example, it had no Internet sales channel. If Hein had developed Rock Bottom
as a franchise it would have given him the opportunity to focus on building the brand, rather than financing the expansion
of the business through the issue of shares.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was still a financially successful company. If it had been franchised at this point, then
Hein could have realised some of his investment (through franchise fees) and used some of this to reward himself, and the
rest of the money could have been used to consolidate the brand. Much of the future financial risk would have been passed
to the franchisees. There would have been no need to take Rock Bottom public and so suffer the scrutiny associated with a
public limited company. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, most of the shops were
trading at a loss. He saw franchising as a way of disposing of the company in what he hoped was a sufficiently well-structured
way. In effect, it was to minimise losses. It seems highly unlikely that franchisees would have been attracted by investing in
something that was actually making a loss. Even if they were, it is unlikely that the franchise fees (and hence the money
immediately realised) would be very high.
第14题:
第15题:
第16题:
第17题:
第18题:
Many()shops will be forced to close if the new supermarket is built.
Alocal
Bbroad
Cgeneral
Dpublic
第19题:
Neighbourhood
第20题:
Brazilian went to Pao de Acucar because it was a brand from the “First World”
Pao de Acucar was kind of local corner shops and thus cheaper
Middle-class Brazilian went to Pao de Acucar instead of the cheaper local corner shops because of its slogan
Pao de Acucar targeted middle-class consumers
第21题:
convicted
sentenced
arrested
attacked
第22题:
There is a “shrinkage” in market values.
Many goods are not available.
Goods in many shops lack variety.
There are many eases of shop-lifting.
第23题:
the butchers’, the bakers’
the butchers, the bakers
butchers, bakers
the butcher’s, the baker’s